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1. Introduction to the topic and structure of the analysis 
The debate on the relationship between environmental regulation and competitiveness has 
been a topic of debate for a number of years now. As early as 1991, the American 
economist Michael E. Porter introduced a new perspective to this debate. He proposed and 
subsequently elaborated, that stringent environmental regulation (under the condition that 
it is efficient) can lead to win-win situations, in which social welfare as well as the private 
net benefits of firms operating under such regulation can be increased. This is the so-called 
Porter Hypothesis (Porter 1991; Porter & van der Linde 1995). 
Whilst it is not surprising that environmental regulation increases social welfare (which 
usually is the very reason of introducing it), Porter￿s predictions about the effect of 
stringent regulations on private costs and benefits have been an issue of (sometimes 
heated) argument. One important reason for net benefits of stringent regulation at the firm 
level which is often cited by Porter and supporting colleagues is that such regulation can 
induce innovatory activities in firms which increase their competitiveness. 
Opponents of the Porter hypothesis criticize its hidden assumption that firms 
systematically overlook opportunities for (voluntarily) improving their environmental 
performance that would also increase their competitiveness. Metaphorically they argue that 
it is impossible to find a 10-Dollar bill on the ground because if it was there, somebody 
else would have picked it up already. Another aspect of the Porter hypothesis frequently 
criticized is the assumption that existing regulatory regimes are able to design stringent and 
at the same time efficient environmental regulation. Given the historically strong emphasis 
on command-and-control regulation in many countries (e.g. Germany) this critique indeed 
seems to have some merit. 
This working paper wants to assess the Porter hypothesis with regard to two aspects. 
Firstly, it will analyse the theoretical reasoning behind the hypothesis by discussing and 
analyzing the arguments brought forward in favour of and against the hypothesis. This will 
be based on a discussion of different theoretical analyses and models by various authors in 
the field. At the end of this section, the working paper will attempt a comprehensive 
assessment as regards the theoretical validity of the Porter hypothesis. Also it will try to 
formulate conditions under which a favourable (i.e. mutually reinforcing) relationship 
between environmental regulation and competitiveness exists. 
Secondly, the working paper wants to review influential empirical studies trying to test the 
Porter hypothesis. This again will be based on the work of various authors and the attempt   7 
will be to (after comprehensively presenting each study) compare the different studies with 
regard to their conditions and results. One important tool in the review of empirical studies 
is so-called ￿meta-analysis￿ and this working paper will attempt to make use of this tool by 
also analyzing available meta-studies on the subject. The analysis of empirical work will 
allow (at least to some degree) to assess whether the theoretical conclusions about the 
Porter hypothesis are confirmed by empirical research. This will provide further assurance 
on the conditions under which the hypothesis holds and will thus provide important 
information for future policy making. The working paper will close with a comparison 
between theory and empirical evidence and with conclusions that will also point to future 
research needs.  
In proceeding like this, the working paper aims to contribute therefore to both, more 
practical policy making aspects and more theoretical research issues and hopefully 
provides new insights on both of them. 
Prior to any (theoretical or empirical) analysis it is necessary to precisely define the core 
concepts referred to in the Porter hypothesis, i.e. environmental regulation and 
competitiveness. This concerns both theoretical as well as empirical aspects and the 
introduction and discussion of these core concepts will therefore form the Chapters 2 and 3 
of the thesis. Chapter 4 will comprise of the theoretical aspects, whilst Chapter 5 discusses 
empirical work. Finally, Chapter 6 of the working paper will present a comparison and 
conclusions.   8 
2. Types and performance assessment, stringency and efficiency of 
environmental regulations 
2.1 Environmental regulation: types and performance assessment 
2.1.1 Introduction 
In the literature on environmental economics, mainly three instruments are distinguished 
for environmental regulation (see e.g. Endres 1994; Geschwendtner 2000). These are 
standards/emission limits, taxes (based on the Price-Standard approach) and certificates 
(Endres 1994). In addition to these, liability law can be considered as an additional 
approach for environmental policy making, since liability law has significant effects on 
distribution and allocation (Endres 1991). It should be noted that the three types of instru-
ments listed all have the common objective to limit the total emissions in a defined space 
or on a defined surface. All of them also represent government interventions into the 
market system in order to correct for market failures, thereby implicitly risking state failure 
(see e.g. J￿nicke et al. 1989; J￿nicke et al. 1992; Simonis (1989) on these and related 
aspects and Endres & Querner (1993) on a discussion in the context of resource 
economics).
1 
The remainder of this chapter will describe the different instruments for environmental 
regulation and will then assess them with regard to a number of criteria for environmental 
policy making. 
 
2.1.2 Types of instruments for environmental regulation 
Emission limits and standards 
Emission limits/standards are an instrument which defines for all emitters a specific upper 
limit of emissions. This can be defined either in absolute terms or relative to a specific base 
unit, e.g. as emissions per unit of volume. An emission limit is defined in such a way, that 
the sum of all upper emission limits for all emitters is equal to a predefined (regional or 
national) emission limit. Emission limits/standards can also prescribe a specific techno-
logy, thereby reducing the discretion for individual emitters (Endres 1994). 
                                                 
1 Opposed to this the common internalisation strategies (either based on the ￿polluter pays￿ principle and 
Pigouvian taxes or by means of negotiation solutions based on Coases￿s theorem and the Property Rights 
approach) have the primary objective to allocate the monetarised damage caused by economic activities, i.e. 
to internalise external effects and corresponding costs, in order to return to a Pareto-optimal situation (Endres 
1994).   9 
Environmental Taxes and Charges 
Taxes are a standards-oriented instrument, which levies the same tax level on each emitter 
(e.g. a firm). It needs to be set in a way that the added emissions of emitters do not exceed 
the emission levels predefined by regional or national emission ceilings. Whilst however a 
Pigouvian tax results in a Pareto-optimal emission level, the taxes discussed here are based 
on the Price-Standard approach (Baumol & Oates 1971) which achieves a specific 
emissions level/target that does not however have to be necessarily Pareto-optimal 
(Geschwendtner 2000). 
 
Tradable and Transferable Emission Permits and Certificates 
Tradable emission certificates or transferable emission permits are a standards-oriented 
instrument which gives an emitter a right to emit a defined amount of a specific pollutant 
in a defined region or area. Therefore, each emitter needs to cover its total emissions with 
ownership of a sufficient number of emission certificates/permits. Each permit in this 
allows the owner to emit a defined amount of a specific pollutant under precise temporal 
and spatial conditions (e.g. emission only from a point or non-point source). The sum of 
the allowed emissions which correspond to the total of permits/certificates put in 
circulation (or more precisely, of their nominal value) equals the predefined (regional or 
national) emission level/target (Endres 1994; Geschwendtner 2000). 
 
2.1.3 Criteria for assessment of different types of instruments  
A number of criteria can be used to assess different regulatory instruments from an 
economic point of view. The four most important ones to be used in the following are 
(cost) efficiency, dynamic incentive effects, aspects of competition and structural policy 
and the environmental effectiveness of an instrument. 
 
Efficiency 
One basic distinction in the assessment of different instruments for environmental 
regulation is the one between market-oriented and judicially-oriented (command-and-
control) types of instruments. An instrument is market-oriented, if it makes use of the 
market mechanism in order to achieve a predefined emissions level. Under the ideal 
conditions of perfect competition, this would lead to a Pareto-optimal realisation of the   10 
predefined emission level. This characteristic of an instrument for environmental 
regulation can be described as its efficiency (Endres 1994). 
 
Dynamic incentive effects 
Next to efficiency, another important criterion is the degree to which an instrument induces 
technological change. Technological change can be observed in terms of changes in the 
efficiency of the use of factor inputs in production (Geschwendtner 2000, p. 48). An 
instrument would be judged the more positive on this assessment criterion, the more 
technological progress it induces. This refers to both, the rate as well as the direction of 
technological change. For a market-oriented instrument, it seems to be indispensable to 
induce at least a minimum amount of technological progress (ultimately seen as an 
improvement of the state of technology) over time, which is very unlikely in the case of 
emission limits/standards (see Endres (1994) for a detailed discussion of this aspect and its 
link to the state of technology/prescription of specific technologies). This second 
assessment criterion will be referred to in the following as an instrument￿s dynamical 
incentive effects (Endres 1994; Geschwendtner 2000). 
 
Aspects of competition policy and structural policy 
These aspects refer to the degree to which regulatory instruments distort competition or 
have a negative effect on structural or regional policy objectives. For example with a strict 
predefined emission level, the expansion of existing and the entry of new firms into the 
market is not possible anymore. In addition to this, when distributing emission rights under 
a strict predefined emission level according to the seniority principle, older but possibly in-
efficient companies are protected further, thus reducing the intensity of competition in the 
region and ultimately leading to negative effects on competition and structural policy 
(Endres 1994). Opposed to this, with both, taxes and certificates, the phasing-out of 
inefficient plants is fostered. However, other than for taxes, with certificates the predefined 
emissions level is achieved even if structural change (in terms of phasing-out of inefficient 
plants taking place). Therefore, no state intervention is necessary and the problem of a tax-
based policy that remaining at or below the predefined emission target whilst at the same 
time enabling economic growth is avoided (Endres 1994). 
    11 
Environmental effectiveness 
Environmental effectiveness as the fourth criterion commonly used for assessing different 
types of regulatory instruments can be defined as its ability to achieve a predefined 
environmental target (Endres 1994). Environmental effectiveness itself has a number of 
sub-aspects referring to the precise definition of an exogenous target, the required adaption 
time to achieve the target under the instrument chosen, issues of objective-means 
interdependency in the process of realizing the target and the issue of emission reductions 
without a defined target (Endres 1994). 
 
2.1.4. Summary of assessment of different regulatory instruments 
In summary, the different (positive and negative) effects of the different regulatory 
instruments (in their ideal forms) can be evaluated with regard to the different assessment 
criteria laid out in the previous section. This has been done in the following Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Assessment of regulatory instruments for environmental policy 
Criterion Standards  Taxes  Certificates 
Efficiency -  +  + 
Dynamic incentive effects  -  +  + 
Structural and regional policy eff-
ects and distortions of competition  
- + + 
Environmental effectiveness  +  -  + 
 
What can be seen from Table 1 is that taxes and certificates can be differenttiated very 
clearly from a standard in terms of its economic profile (efficiency, dynamic effects etc.). 
This explains why the former instruments are frequently labeled to be ￿market-based￿ and 
the latter to be ￿command-and-control￿ (Endres 1994; Geschwendtner 2000).  
As concerns environmental effectiveness, this is highest for standards and 
permits/certificates, yet uncertain for taxes. However it has to be taken into account here 
the dynamic incentive effect of the instruments as well. This is because the development of 
new, more efficient, technologies for emissions reduction depends on the instrument 
chosen. This means that even whilst leading to higher emissions in the (static) short term, 
an instrument with higher incentive effects with regard to technology development may in 
the longer term lead to higher emission reductions since it has more potential to achieve a   12 
move towards a more efficient production function (Geschwendtner 2000). As will be seen 
in the next section, this aspect is pivotal to the Porter hypothesis. 
 
2.2 Stringency and Efficiency of Environmental Regulations 
As can be seen from the differing assessment of instrument types for environmental 
regulation, one of the important factors for the relationship between environmental 
regulation and economic competitiveness are regulatory stringency and efficiency. This 
concerns e.g. performance versus ambient standards, mandated end-of-pipe technology 
versus clean technology/clean production, process change versus demand side measures, 
legislation versus economic instruments (such as price- or incentive-based regulation), co-
operative versus confrontational industry-regulator relationships (e.g. forced vs. 
voluntary/negotiated agreements). 
With regard to level, efficiency and future developments in regulation, it can be expected 
that the relationship between environmental regulation and economic competitiveness will 
be stronger positive in countries and sectors with a more efficient approach to regulation. 
For example, Jaffe et al. (1995, p. 135) point out that keeping ￿.. constant the stringency of 
environmental standards, the form these rules take can potentially affect business location 
[italicised as in the original, M.W.]￿ or, it could be argued, competitiveness in general. 
Next to the strictness/stringency of environmental regulation, it is also necessary to 
consider the efficiency of regulation depending on the instruments used. From the point of 
economic theory it is usually argued that the use of economic instruments is more efficient 
than a command-and-control approach. However, it has also to be taken into account, to 
what degree regulations are designed and implemented efficiently (as it may be that 
command-and-control legislation can be implemented more efficiently than economic 
instruments). 
Efficiency of regulation is an important issue in empirical testing the Porter hypothesis i.e. 
the idea of a ￿double dividend￿ between tough environmental regulations and economic 
competitiveness, based on the notion that stringent environmental legislation at the national 
level will in the longer run lead to competitive advantages of the regulated firms (Porter 
1991). This is because properly designed environmental regulation can produce 
organisational and technical innovations which lead to production efficiency gains that   13 
may result in absolute advantage over non-regulated firms (Porter & van der Linde 1995)
2. 
However, as Romstad (1998) points out, in order to empirically test the Porter hypothesis, 
it has to be assumed that regulations are efficient, since if this condition is not met, any 
empirical rejection of the hypothesis could be based on increased costs from the 
inefficiency of regulation, instead of a direct negative effect of regulations on firm￿s 
competitiveness.
3  
From the assessment of different types of instruments for environmental regulation in 
Chapter 2.1 it becomes clear that taxes and certificates are likely much more suited to bring 
about effects such as those proposed in the Porter hypothesis than are emission 
limits/standards. The expectation is that this will also be reflected by the theoretical and 
empirical work on the Porter hypothesis that will be discussed in Chapters 4 und 5. 
                                                 
2 One core question is consequently how environmental pressures influence the rate and direction of 
technological and organisational change within firms. 
3 In so far evidence in Scandinavia (Br￿nnlund et al. 1995) and in the United States of America (Jaffe et al. 
1995) against the Porter hypothesis has to be treated cautiously, since regulation in both countries is 
inefficient (Hahn 1989; Br￿nnlund et al. 1995).    14 
3. The concept of competitiveness: its theoretical definition and 
empirical measurement 
3.1 Introduction: the concept of international competitiveness 
The concept of competitiveness of nations has been very influential for the economic and 
political debate of the 1990s. Competitiveness for example was a major driving force 
behind the Single Market in the European Union (EU) in order to capture economies of 
scale and to break down competitive barriers (CEC 1993).  It had also considerable 
influence on corporate environmental management. Thompson (1998) identifies five 
independent trends that brought competitiveness at the forefront of the debate: 
1.  The collapse of the Cold War and thus the struggle between two ideological formations 
which locked all world issues into a single geomilitary dimension, 
2.  The (perceived) unsuccessfulness of large-scale and national initiatives on ￿industrial 
policy￿ and ￿industrial strategy￿, 
3.  The trend towards policies of liberalisation, de-regulation and privatisation, which, 
although often perceived as a result of internationalisation and globalisation of 
economic activity, are suggested to be driven rather by domestic decisions and policy 
changes (Thompson 1998), 
4. The ￿success￿ of inter-governmental organisations such as the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in opening-up the 
world economies and in reducing protectionist barriers,  
5.  The increased interdependence and integration in the world economy since 1945. 
According to Thompson (1998), these five trends raised the importance of the relative 
competitiveness of different countries and resulted in mainly three explanatory frameworks 
for differences in competitiveness, which are: 
(i)  The Domestic Interests approach, which stresses similar patterns and processes for 
understanding the relative economic performance of national economies, 
(ii)  The Actor-Interactions approach, which stresses the interactions between key actors 
in the conduct of international relations (rather than domestic interests), and 
(iii)  The Geoeconomic approach, which has a less explanatory stance and stresses the 
strategic interrelationship between the three main groups in the international 
economic system, as well as the importance of redefining the nature of international   15 
security after the collapse of the Cold War and the decline of United States of 
America (U.S.) hegemony (Thompson 1998). 
 
3.2 Definitions and measures of international competitiveness 
In the discussion on the relationship between environmental regulation and 
competitiveness, several definitions of competitiveness are referred to. The OECD, for 
example, defines international competitiveness as ￿the degree to which (a country) can, 
under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services which meet the test of 
international markets, while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of 
its people over the longer term (OECD 1992, p. 237)￿.
4 Alternatively, Boltho (1996) 
defines short-term international competitiveness as ￿￿ equated with the real value of the 
exchange rate (p. 3)￿ and long-term competitiveness as ￿￿ virtually synonymous with 
trend productivity growth (p. 3)￿.  
Other measures that are mainly used to assess international competitiveness of nations are 
changes in unit labour costs, changes in the share of world exports of goods and services, 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) performance of countries. In summary, a number of 
measures of international competitiveness of nations have been identified (Barker & 
K￿hler 1998; Jaffe et al. 1995, pp. 137-138; Thompson 1998). 
The above OECD definition refers to the ￿capacity to sustain and increase a country￿s 
participation in international markets, by being able to meet standards of efficiency 
(regarding the use of factors of production and natural resources) and product quality of the 
rest of the world (OECD 1992, p. 237)￿. In doing so, it points to the fact that 
￿competitiveness￿ achieved by means of exchange rate devaluations, low domestic wages 
and public expenditure cuts is generally associated with reduced real income. Thus only 
the ability of a country to secure sales in the international market should result in increased 
domestic welfare (Hopkins & Cabalu 1993). However, this definition is rather qualitative 
and thus difficult to measure based on national economic accounts. For this purpose, the 
quantitative measures of real exchange rate value and trend productivity growth as measu-
res for short- and long-term competitiveness respectively are more appropriate. 
Nevertheless, their adoption can also lead to problems (Hopkins & Cabalu 1993, pp. 15-
27). In the case of the real exchange rate for example, these relate to the use of different 
                                                 
4 This definition was originally proposed by the U.S. President￿s Commission on Industrial Competitiveness 
in 1995.   16 
indices, weighting systems, and its relationship to a country￿s trade balance (Hopkins & 
Cabalu 1993, pp. 15-18).  
 
3.3 The use of empirical competitiveness measures for measuring the competitiveness of 
industries and firms 
A key question is to what extent measures of international competitiveness at the national 
level are relevant for an analysis at the industry/sectoral or firm/site levels. Overall, since 
only a small percentage of a country￿s product (i.e. its Gross Domestic Product, GDP) is 
usually exported, the emphasis on trade and international competitiveness measures may 
be overstated and changes in national productivity (independent of international 
competitive/foreign trade considerations) may be considerably more important since a 
large part of the economic success is based on a ￿sheltered￿ domestic sector (Thompson 
1998). This is even more so in countries with a low degree of export orientation. 
Consequently, productivity improvements (esp. labour productivity) and conditions 
internal to firms may be more important sources of competitiveness, with cheap and 
abundant labour, natural resources and favourable exchange rates being less relevant, in 
particular when considering effects of environmental regulation (Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 138). 
In this view, national prosperity is not inherited, but created by the capacity of a country￿s 
industry to innovate and to employ new technologies (Porter 1998). This leads to increased 
product quality, improved product technology and increased production efficiency. The 
key factors that determine success in achieving this (and in doing so support high wages 
and command high prices in international markets) are (Porter 1980; 1998): 
•  availability of factors of production, including skilled labour and infrastructure; 
•  nature and level of domestic demand; 
•  availability of internationally competitive supplier industries; and 
•  conditions governing the creation, organisation, and management of firms and those 
governing domestic competition. 
This is the so-called ￿diamond of national advantage￿ (Porter 1985; 1998) in which all 
factors interact and reinforce each other. 
Although measures such as trend productivity growth address this caveat of measures for 
international competitiveness based on trade theory and comparative cost advantages, it is 
advisable to use measures that more directly (i.e. at the industry and firm levels) assess the   17 
effect of environmental regulation on firm￿s productivity and consequently their economic 
performance, such as e.g. true costs of environmental protection.  
Another argument why not to use national competitiveness measures (e.g. changes in net 
exports or the pattern of imports and exports, or FDI performance), but more direct 
measures to assess the effect of environmental regulation on firm￿s economic performance 
may be that the evidence gathered using competitiveness measures at the national level for 
the U.S. does not provide much support against the Porter hypothesis (Jaffe et al. 1995)
5. 
This may mean that other macro-level trends and influences are too strong to single out the 
effect of stringent environmental regulation on these measures, requiring the use of more 
detailed measures at the meso- or micro-levels to detangle their effects from general 
economic effects (such as inflation processes, exchange rate changes, or economic 
recession for example).  
It could also mean that the above evidence supports the arguments brought forward for 
example in the Ecological Modernisation debate (Simonis 1989; J￿nicke et al. 1989; 
J￿nicke et al. 1992) i.e. the view that economic growth (based on increased or maintained 
national competitiveness) can be decoupled from environmental pollution. 
Next to the conceptual limitations of competitiveness measures at the national level in 
measuring international competitiveness satisfactorily, they also seem to be too broad (and 
as well theoretically problematic) to be used to assess competitiveness at the sector or firm 
levels, since countries do not engage in competition in the same way that firms do 
(Krugman 1994). This is, because the concept of international competitiveness discussed 
so far refers only to national economies and is fundamentally rooted in conventional trade 
theory where economies always have some form of comparative cost advantage. A 
comparative advantage of one country over another in a broad factor of production is 
however only one source of the national competitiveness of a country. 
Beyond such comparative advantages, many other levels of competitiveness exist (Porter 
1980; 1985), and as Porter (1998) points out international competitive advantage can often 
be concentrated in narrowly defined industries or even particular industry segments (such 
as e.g. the environmental technology industry). Such success of individual companies in 
                                                 
5 This is not too unexpected, given the small share (of around 2 percent in industrialised countries) that direct 
costs of environmental protection have at the macroeconomic level in national GDP (Jaffe et al. 1995; Luken 
1997; Silveira 2000). Since the U.S. have almost the highest share of direct compliance costs in GDP it can 
be argued that results for them are to some extent an upper limit estimate of the impact of environmental 
regulation on competitiveness. Jaffe et al. (1995) note however that whilst international differences in en-
vironmental costs are relatively small, (compared to labour cost and productivity differentials) inter-industry 
variation of environmental costs in the U.S. is very high. (p. 142).   18 
specific industries or industry segments can therefore be another source of a nation￿s 
competitiveness, other than comparative cost advantages in a broad factor of production 
(such as labour or capital). Success in this respect is based on competitive advantages, 
other than comparative advantages, of a firm or a set of firms over their competitors in 
other countries. 
In the case that a country manages to locate a critical mass of (in the sense of competitive 
advantage) internationally competitive companies on its territory, it will demonstrate 
national competitiveness, revealed by e.g. increasing shares of world trade or sustained 
currency appreciation (Thompson 1998). In this, the international competitiveness of a 
country is essentially the result of competitive advantages in (a possibly relatively small 
number of) specific industrial sectors or (even narrower) sub-sectoral industrial segments, 
superimposed with the broad comparative cost advantages the country has.  
A reconsideration of the measures of international competitiveness introduced in Chapter 
3.2 (real value of the exchange rate, trend productivity growth, changes in unit labour 
costs, changes in the shares of world exports of goods and services and FDI performance) 
points to one of the fundamental limitations of the whole debate which is that it 
concentrates on relatively direct outcome measures of international competitiveness.  
This is also mirrored by the claims of the necessity to improve the overall supply side of 
ailing economies mainly through promotion of specific education and training 
programmes, increased research and development (R&D) expenditures and creation of an 
entrepreneurial climate, which are more indirect, leading variables. So far however, only 
little systematic or robust empirical evidence exists that causally links levels of education 
or training competencies, R&D expenditures or economic innovativeness, with the 
discussed measures for international competitiveness of a country (Thompson 1998). 
However, more correlation was found between the change in R&D expenditure per unit of 
GDP and the change in market share of exports, than for the correlation between decline in 
price competitiveness (measured by unit labour costs) and such change in export shares 
(Fagerberg 1996). The above theoretical frameworks and measures discussed often neglect 
the influence technology has on trade and prices by identifying international 
competitiveness with relative unit costs or prices (Barker & K￿hler 1998).  
Taken together these results point to the need to also consider non-economic measures to 
assess the competitiveness of a country and companies. Competitiveness of countries and 
competition between countries is, as derived above, taking place in a larger frame of 
reference which includes characteristics as diverse as living standards or military power.   19 
These are however likely to be more influenced by more indirect measures and 
characteristics, such as the general institutional framework of the labour market, the forms 
of settlement between social partners and organized interest groups, the form of the 
financial system, or the constitutional nature of corporate governance systems, rather than 
the specific economic measures and instruments suggested to improve supply side 
conditions. Measures that assess the strength of a country with regard to these more 
indirect measures and characteristics are likely to be more related to rather qualitative 
aspects of its culture such as the degree of innovativeness, pluralism, political openness 
and space for a critical ￿culture of ideas￿, than to economic measures of international 
competitiveness (Thompson 1998)
6. In conclusion this means that an operationalisation of 
the concept of international competitiveness should ideally take into account as well more 
qualitative performance measures to assess a country￿s potential for international economic 
performance and success. 
 
3.4 Linking international competitiveness and competitive advantage 
As stated earlier, international competitiveness can be understood as being determined by 
comparative as well as competitive advantages. Although economies always have certain 
comparative advantages, it is not certain that they will as well always have competitive 
advantages in certain lines of production (Thompson 1998). One reason for this is, that 
comparative advantages apply mainly to sectors where success depends on natural 
comparative factor endowments (such as labour or natural resources), whereas competitive 
advantages mainly apply to sectors where success can be created and fostered deliberately 
through changes in organisational structures or behaviour (e.g. manufacturing or services 
industries). In short, comparative advantage mainly refers to natural conditions of a 
country (its ￿hardware￿, e.g. resource availability and consequently factor prices) whereas 
competitive advantage mainly refers to its social conditions (the ￿software￿, e.g. labour 
conditions, technology availability and R&D activities). The social conditions are 
influenced for example by bandwagon effects and processes such as positive feedback or 
learning by doing which potentially lead to cumulative growth trajectories as described in 
the dynamic modelling literature (Kaldor 1981; Thompson 1998). One consequence out of 
this is that the attempt to enhance existing domestic competitive structures of sectors where 
                                                 
6 However, although this claim has been often stated, the empirical evidence for it is sometimes weak in that 
e.g. Pascale and Athos (1982) found that rather than qualitative cultural aspects, a new use and combination 
of standard managerial ploys is (at least sometimes) a key source of international competitiveness.   20 
other countries already have a comparative advantage seems not to be very promising, 
although a co-ordinated attempt to emulate or outperform already in other countries highly 
successful sectors may well be successful (Thompson 1998). 
Another aspect of the relationship between international competitiveness and competitive 
advantage is the question if countries are competing economically at all. Clearly, countries 
do not go bankrupt in the same way firms do if they are economically unsuccessful, and, 
contrary to firms, with nations the bulk of their product (its GDP) is consumed by a 
nation￿s own citizens with only a small percentage being exported. Another fundamental 
difference between firms competing against other firms for shares in a particular market 
and countries competing against other countries in several markets is the fact that a 
country￿s currency exchange rates can vary in a way that offsets long-term competitive 
advantages of one country over the other (Barker & K￿hler 1998). This leads to the 
conclusion that one cannot easily compare companies and countries with regard to 
international competitiveness. Based on this, some conclusions that can be drawn from the 
competitiveness debate and which should be taken into account when analysing empirical 
studies on the relationship between environmental regulation and competitiveness are 
discussed in the following final section. 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
As was explained earlier in Chapter 3, the notion of international competitiveness of a 
country is partly misleading, since there are distinct differences between countries and 
companies (Krugman 1994). Nevertheless, the ability of companies to sell products in 
competition with companies form other countries is an issue, since it is the competitive 
advantage of companies that leads to a competitive advantage of a national economy, 
measured as an increase in its share of world trade or a sustained appreciation of its 
currency or through similar measures of international competitiveness (Barker & K￿hler 
1998; Thompson 1998). It is in this sense correct to perceive a country￿s international 
competitiveness as (at least partly) determined by the competitive advantage of individual 
companies, since international competitiveness can be described as the superposition of 
competitive advantage and comparative advantage. In other words: only if a country has a 
critical mass of firms with a competitive advantage in a specific sector (over firms in the 
same industrial sector in other countries) than it will have a visible competitive advantage 
in this industrial sector. In the next step, the international competitiveness of a country can   21 
be disaggregated into the level of sectoral competitiveness in each industrial sector (which 
is, in turn, determined by the sum of competitive advantages of individual firms). Sectoral 
competitiveness also varies with the comparative advantage a country has as a result of its 
natural comparative factor endowments, i.e. competitiveness at the level of industry sectors 
partly results from the interaction of competitive and comparative advantages, which have 
rather distinct sources (i.e. comparative advantage is based more on natural conditions, 
whereas competitive advantage is based more on social conditions of the country in 
question). The result of the aggregation from firm level to sector level are finally national 
profiles of sectoral competitiveness which can be further aggregated to levels of national 
competitiveness (e.g. based on the change of shares of world exports of goods and services 
or the changes in unit labour costs).  
For the analysis of the Porter hypothesis, an important conclusion is that competitiveness 
cannot be defined in one unique way, and depending on the definition chosen, findings 
may differ. Jaffe et al. (1995) suggest as the ideal measure for analyzing the Porter 
hypothesis and the link between regulation and competitiveness in general the effect that 
an environmental regulation or policy has on net exports ￿￿ holding real wages and 
exchange rates constant (Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 136)￿. However, this ideal measure would 
require to formulate and estimate (with reliable data) ￿￿ a structural econometric model in 
which net exports by industry, wages, and exchanges rates are determined jointly as a 
function of regulatory costs and resource endowments (Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 137)￿. Also, 
this measure would be measuring outcomes, but not drivers for competitive advantage at 
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4. Theoretical analysis of the Porter hypothesis 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical debate surrounding the Porter hypothesis started almost immediately after 
the initial papers by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) were published 
(e.g. Palmer et al. 1995). Nevertheless, detailed formal models emerged only somewhat 
later in the debate (e.g. Simpson & Bradford 1996; Romstad 1998; Xepapadeas & de 
Zeeuw 1999; Lankoski 2000; Alpay 2001; Mohr 2002). This chapter wants to initially 
discuss (in Chapter 4.2) arguments for the validity of the Porter hypothesis, based on 
Porter￿s and his colleagues own arguments, as well as briefly review the critique by others 
of these initial arguments. Following this (in Chapter 4.3), a number of relevant formal 
models shall be briefly reviewed with regard to their structure and outcomes. This will 
assist in identifying factors and conditions under which the Porter hypothesis is most likely 
to hold and which limit the area of validity of the Porter hypothesis. The chapter concludes 
(in Chapter 4.4) with a summary of key results and conclusions from theoretical analysis of 
and reasoning about the Porter hypothesis. 
 
4.2 The basic arguments concerning the Porter hypothesis  
The basic argument of the Porter hypothesis was initially formulated in a one-page article 
(Porter 1991) and was subsequently elaborated on by Porter and van der Linde (1995) as 
well as Esty and Porter (1998). Porter (1991) states that ￿strict environmental regulations 
do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against foreign rivals (p. 96)￿. This is the 
basic idea behind the Porter hypothesis. The starting point of the analysis is ￿￿ that the 
environment-competitiveness debate has been framed incorrectly (Porter & van der Linde 
1995, p. 97)￿. Porter and his co-workers point to the central role of innovations and 
identify as the main theoretical argument for the Porter hypothesis that in reality, one is 
faced with a dynamic competition process, rather than a framework of static optimization. 
Because firms are ￿￿ currently in a transitional phase of industrial history where 
companies are still inexperienced in dealing creatively with environmental issues (Porter & 
van der Linde 1995, p. 99)￿, this implies incomplete information and organizational inertia 
and as a result of this the possibility of new technological opportunities. In such a situation 
properly designed regulation can have an influence on the direction of innovation in that 
(Porter & van der Linde 1995, p. 99-100):   23 
•  it signals to firms resource inefficiencies and possibilities for technological 
improvement; 
•  if focused on information provision, it can increase firms￿ awareness for improvement 
potentials (such as e.g. the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain (UK) Pollution Inventory, or the soon mandatory systems under the 
European Union￿s Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) regulations); 
•  it reduces the uncertainty of net paybacks from investments; 
•  it ￿￿ motivates innovation and progress (Porter & van der Linde 1995, p. 100)
7￿; 
•  it provides a ￿level playing field￿ and is necessary in situations with incomplete 
offsets. 
The concept of offsets is central to the argument behind the Porter hypothesis. Innovation 
offsets can either be product offsets or process offsets. In the former case, these refer to 
products with better (environmental) performance or higher quality, or to lower product 
costs or safer products. This form of offsets is based on innovations which at the same time 
reduce the environmental impacts of a product and increase its performance or production 
processes. 
Opposed to this, process offsets lead to increased resource productivity and are mostly 
linked to reduced compliance cost. The argument then is that stringent regulation leads to 
greater innovation than lax regulation, since the latter can often be addressed by ￿end-of-
pipe￿ pollution control
8 and secondary treatment equipment. Stringent regulation may 
                                                 
7 By this Porter and van der Linde mean that regulations (next to competitors, customers and changes in 
relative prices for factor inputs) have a pivotal function in giving external input to a firm to motivate and 
trigger innovation processes. 
8 Pollution control is one of the earliest strategies adopted by businesses to meet the requirements of newly 
emerging environmental legislation and emission limits. It assumes fixed production processes and product 
designs and consequently solutions focused on ￿end-of-pipe￿ technologies involving environmental 
investments that represented high extra costs for firms (Porter & van der Linde 1995; Cohen et. al. 1995). 
The most visible artifact of the pollution control approach is probably flue-gas de-sulphurisation technology 
used to abate sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power stations[0]. Interestingly, pollution control 
expenditures developed into a measure of environmental performance/regulatory burden (Cohen et. al. 1995) 
which is comparable to the use of GDP as a welfare measure i.e. it is assessing the effort to achieve an 
objective rather than the objective itself. Pollution control as an environmental strategy can be characterised 
by compliance with all environmental, health and safety regulations (Fava & Smith 1998) and can be 
considered the minimum level of environmental strategy a firm can adopt without pursuing illegal activities. 
Pursuing pollution control as a corporate environmental strategy involves the use of expensive and non-
productive investments in pollution control equipment and only leads to compliance with existing regulations 
(Hart & Ahuja 1996). It therefore reduces earnings (due to high expenditure and low cost savings and   24 
increase compliance costs, but ￿while the potential for innovation offsets may rise even 
faster .. the net cost of compliance can fall with stringency and may even turn into a net 
benefit (Porter & van der Linde 1995, p. 100)￿.  
 
4.3 Formal models analysing the Porter hypothesis  
A number of formal models have been proposed to make possible or to show the 
limitations of the Porter hypothesis. These shall be briefly reviewed in the following with 
regard to their structure and main results before a synthesis on the theoretical knowledge 
about the Porter hypothesis is attempted in the final section of Chapter 4. 
 
Sinclair-DesgagnØ and Gabel provide a theoretical analysis (Sinclair-DesgagnØ 1999; 
Gabel & Sinclair-DesgagnØ 2001; 1993) in which they suggest for environmental 
regulation to be considered ￿￿ an industrial policy instrument aimed at increasing the 
competitiveness of firms, the underlying rationale for this statement being that well-
designed environmental regulation could force firms to seek innovations that would turn 
out to be both privately and socially profitable (Sinclair-DesgagnØ 1999, p. 2)￿.  The 
argument made is that that the interaction between environmental regulatory policy and the 
allocation of  resources is complex, multi-step, and imperfect (Gabel & Sinclair-DesgangØ 
2001), for which a number of reasons are cited, the first of which is that it would be ￿￿ 
inconsistent, albeit convenient, to assume that markets are flawed but that firms are perfect 
(Gabel & Sinclair-DesgangØ 2001, p. 149)￿ and that organizational failures which ￿￿ are 
analogous in many respects to the problems of externalities in ￿ market-mediated 
transactions (Gabel & Sinclair-DesgagnØ 2001, p. 150)￿ are of importance here because 
they ￿￿ are relevant to the firm￿s management as well ￿ since their manifestation is 
frequently unachieved profit potential (Gabel & Sinclair-DesgagnØ 2001, p. 150)￿.  
A second point is that organisational failures are necessary for the existence of innovations 
that simultaneously improve environmental performance and economic competitiveness of 
firms. Despite of this, ￿standard neoclassical-economics models .. do not support the 
systematic presence of low-hanging fruits (Sinclair-DesgagnØ 1999, p. 3)￿ because in these 
models ￿.. innovation itself is not free, and if one prices managerial time and all other in-
                                                                                                                                                    
revenues) but also environmental risks and is often considered a necessary expense for continuing operations 
and protecting the value of a firm￿s assets including brands and other intangible assets (Reed 1998). 
   25 
puts correctly at their opportunity costs, it should become clear that putting stronger 
environmental requirements on polluting firms generally increases their production cost 
more than their revenue (Sinclair-DesgagnØ 1999, p. 2)￿. Increases in production costs 
should have an observable effect on a firm￿s profitability. The existence of cheap 
innovations ￿.. is logically most likely in situations where the firm is far from the 
efficiency frontier, where the burden of the compliance cost is light, and where the shift to 
the frontier can be made cheaply (Gabel & Sinclair-DesgangØ 2001, p. 152)￿. 
These considerations of Sinclair-DesgangØ and Gabel support one important aspect of the 
Porter hypothesis, namely inefficiencies within firms which are revealed under stringent 
regulations. If such organisational failures are systematically caused by perverse 
incentives, imperfect information, moral hazard, hidden actions or strategic behaviour then 
this renders credit to the mechanism behind the Porter hypothesis, namely the discovery of 
win-win-opportunities for innovation, even if those already existed prior to any regulation. 
Given that firm-internal, (quasi-regulatory) instruments exist to address such failures, 
including contract design, centralization and decentralization of authority, task allocation 
decisions, accounting systems and monitoring technologies (Gabel & Sinclair-DesgagnØ 
2001) it seems an important research question which type of government policy is most 
supportive to rectify organizational failures.
9 
 
Lankoski (2000) analyses a model with vertical product differentiation
10 in a duopoly. In 
such a model, environmental performance can be understood as a quality variable, 
assuming that its improvement does not imply any trade-offs. Assuming two firms - one 
supplying a product with high and another supplying one with low environmental 
performance ￿ and consumers with a willingness to pay for environmental performance 
greater than zero, the model analyses outcomes based on full and incomplete market 
coverage. The formal analysis of the model reveals that in a duopoly where firms engage in 
a two-stage game (first choosing environmental performance levels and than either (in case 
of Bertrand competition) prices or (in case of Cournot competition) quantities) firms 
always supply products with different environmental performance levels.  
                                                 
9 The basic argument nevertheless remains the X-efficiency argument that external shocks caused by 
stringent environmental regulations may reduce inefficiencies and failure within the firm (Xepapadeas & de 
Zeeuw 1999). 
10 Product differentiation refers to the degree to which products are perceived differently by buyers, measured 
e.g. through the cross-price elasticity of demand (Moschandreas 1994).   26 
According to Lankoski (2000) the implication of this is that the link between 
environmental regulation and competitiveness is not uniform in cases where firms￿ choices 
are not independent of one another. In particular, the selected environmental performance 
levels may not be socially optimal, thus justifying regulatory intervention. This provides an 
indication that the validity of the Porter hypothesis may crucially depend on specific 
circumstances, like e.g. the industry￿s market structure.
11 
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) in their model show that downsizing and modernization 
in firms subjected to stringent environmental regulations increases their average 
profitability, thus having a positive effect on the marginal change of profitability and 
environmental performance.
12 Doubting the general validity of the Porter hypothesis they 
nevertheless acknowledge that in strategic trade models ￿￿ it is possible to construct 
specific examples in which foreign R&D decreases and home profits increase under an 
environmental tax (Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw 1999, p. 166)￿. Their starting point is 
however a different one in that Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw analyse in their model the 
reaction of firms in terms of the type and the quantity of equipment that firms invest in as a 
response to production cost changes. They show that the increase in production costs from 
stringent environmental regulations leads to a capital stock restructuring which in turn 
                                                 
11 For example, general product differentiation may be a precondition for successful environmental product 
differentiation in a market. Further necessary preconditions can then be derived from a more detailed analysis 
of the factors influencing specifically environmental product differentiation. Alanen (1998) suggests that if a 
product has a low own-price elasticity of demand, bundles environmental goods with private goods and 
provides scope for environmental image and content differentiation then the likelihood is higher for a win-
win situation between social and private welfare. The own-price elasticity of demand is depending on avail-
ability of substitutes, presence of switching costs for customers and the degree of price-based competition in 
the market, in relation to the level of competition based on differentiation. Environmental content 
differentiation refers to the benefit from the product for the customer and is possible, if the public good of 
improved environmental performance can be combined with a private good (i.e. a product attribute, e.g. price 
or quality, which is of benefit exclusively for the individual customer purchasing the good) in one product. 
Environmental image differentiation refers to the ability of a product to communicate information about the 
purchaser to him-/herself or others. Together, the scope for environmental content and image differentiation 
determine the customer￿s willingness to pay for environmental differentiation which refers to the importance 
customers give to communicated environmental performance in their buying decisions (Alanen 1998). 
Willingness to pay, together with customer perception of environmental differentiation (which results from 
the communicated environmental performance of a company) determine the ultimate private benefits of the 
purchasing customers. Therefore the potential for successful environmental product differentiation depends 
on three necessary pre-conditions, which are together also sufficient (Reinhardt 1999, pp.151-152): (i) 
customer willingness to pay for environmental differentiation (implying a high level of general product 
differentiation), (ii) information about the environmental and private benefits conferred by the product, and 
(iii) inability of competitors to replicate environmental product differentiation. 
12 Their starting point is (as is for many others) that competitiveness (here understood as changes in trade and 
investment patterns) is empirically not much affected by stringent environmental regulation. They 
acknowledge however, that the ability to empirically measure the stringency of regulation is limited due to 
compliance costs only being a small fraction of total production costs, relatively small stringency 
differentials between countries and because often investments are made in state-of-art technology regardless 
of the regulation level required (Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw 1999).   27 
increases the average productivity of firms. At the same time, in their model (in which 
firms invest in equipment of different ages) stricter environmental regulations (modeled in 
terms of an increase in an emission tax) result in a reduction of the amount of equipment of 
all ages and thus a reduction of firm size, which they refer to as a ￿downsizing￿ effect. This 
effect refers to a reduction in total capital stock and together with a ￿modernization￿ effect 
(which reduces the capital stock￿s average age by accelerating the removal of older 
equipment) leads to the conclusion that it ￿￿ is not that a win-win situation can be 
expected, but the trade-off between improving the environment and the competitiveness of 
the home industry is not as grim as it is sometimes suggested because of favourable change 
in the composition of capital stock (Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw 1999, p. 167)￿. 
The model reveals that the additional cost of more stringent regulation are mitigated by the 
￿downsizing￿ effect (leading to upward pressure on prices), the ￿modernization￿ effect 
(increasing the capital stock productivity), and the joint effect of both (allowing to reach an 
emission target with a lower tax level). The model shows further that the marginal decrease 
in profitability is lower and the marginal decrease in emissions higher in a situation with 
heterogeneous capital (in which both downsizing and modernizing occur) compared to a 
situation with homogeneous capital (in which only downsizing is possible) and that any 
effects are only affecting those ages of the capital stock on which the higher tax level is 
levied (Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw 1999). In summary therefore, the model of Xepapadeas 
and de Zeeuw (1999) remains somewhat skeptical about the Porter hypothesis in that it 
questions the necessity of stringent regulation for the realization of existing win-win 
opportunities (better environmental performance and reduced production costs or 
innovation offsets in excess of the additional costs of regulation) but also shows that trade-
offs between environmental quality and competitiveness may be less pronounced than 
commonly thought, thus explaining at least in part the empirical finding of insignificant 
links between regulation and competitiveness. 
 
Simpson & Bradford III (1996) provide an early theoretical argument, why the Porter 
hypothesis that stringent environmental regulation leads to improved industrial 
performance because it induces innovation and higher resource efficiency is likely not the 
usual case. They state that ￿￿ it is by no means clear that the benefits will repay the 
investment in the necessary innovation (Simpson & Bradford III 1996, p. 283)￿ with ￿￿ 
innovation as the mechanism by which stringent environmental regulation is translated into 
long-run competitive advantage (Simpson & Bradford III 1996, p. 283)￿. Their argument is   28 
based on the assumption that increased competitiveness of firms is the result of reduced 
marginal costs. According to them the direct effect of regulation is to increase costs, and 
only the indirect effect would be reduced variable (and thus marginal) costs through 
innovation. In their model, they ￿￿ suppose that the government￿s objective is to 
maximize a domestic firm￿s profits net of the (presumed) environmental externalities it 
imposes (Simpson & Bradford III 1996, p. 283)￿. The benchmark here is a Pigouvian tax 
and the question is whether it is optimal to apply an effluent tax lower or higher than the 
marginal damage caused by an industry. To analyse this question, a model is used with a 
Cournot duopoly involving a domestic and a foreign firm in which ￿￿ the domestic 
government tries to create an advantage for a domestic firm selling in a foreign market 
(Simpson & Bradford III 1996, p. 284)￿ with the government policy being represented by 
an effluent tax. 
The main finding of the model is that whilst ￿.. it is possible to develop a model in which 
effluent taxes in excess of marginal external damages are optimal (Simpson & Bradford III 
1996, p. 284)￿ this is not an easy task so that stringent regulations induce innovation only 
in very special cases and are thus unlikely to generate broad advantages  because of 
complex interactions making likely differences across industry sectors. Hence, ￿.. even if 
tougher environmental regulations did serve to enhance competitive advantage, the same 
objective might be achieved more effectively by more direct and conventional policies 
(Simpson & Bradford III 1996, p. 284)￿, and therefore ￿￿tightening regulation to induce 
advantage may be extremely dubious as practical policy advice (Simpson & Bradford III 
1996, p. 284)￿. In addition to these conclusions, Simpson and Bradford III (1996) find in 
their model, that the optimality of taxes in excess of marginal damages depends also on 
international spillovers of innovation expenditures and on innovatory activities of foreign 
firms as a response on domestic environmental policy-making which can not be predicted 
with high generality and precision. The results in their simple model thus ￿￿ cast serious 
doubts on the efficacy of environmental policy as industrial policy (Simpson & Bradford 
III 1996, p. 285)￿ increasing the competitiveness of domestic firms through innovation 
induced by environmental policy making. 
 
Alpay (2001) compares the model with effluent tax analysed by Simpson and Bradford III 
(1996) with a model based on a tradable emission permit system. In his model, two 
symmetric firms competing in a Cournot oligopoly in each of two countries are analysed. 
The firms, which all have identical marginal costs, produce one (perfectly substitutable)   29 
good generating emissions assumed to be proportional to the output of the firms. Next to 
reducing output, abatement is possible for each firm to reduce emissions, with the 
abatement cost function being convex in abatement (Alpay 2001). To regulate the firms in 
the two countries, a tradable emission permit system is used which is applied to all firms. 
Initially, all firms are assigned the same identical amounts of tradable permits and the 
market for permits (which can be sold at a positive price, if a firm￿s permit demand is 
smaller than its initial endowment) is perfectly competitive. Solving the firms￿ optimi-
zation problems in the equilibrium by deriving the first order conditions results in the firm-
specific reaction functions. 
Alpay (2001) assumes a model, in which after distributing an initial amount of permits, one 
country puts more stringent regulation in place by reducing the number of permits, whilst 
the other country does not change its regulation. Firms in the former country may carry out 
R&D (at positive cost) to develop (with a defined success probability) a new 
production/abatement technology (resulting in reduced emissions), or they may continue to 
use the existing technology. Four cases can now be distinguished as outcomes of the 
model. Firstly, if both firms continue with their existing technologies, then ￿stricter 
regulations at home country will make foreign firms better-off unconditionally; however, 
due to changes in permit prices, it is not always true that domestic regulations will make 
domestic firms less competitive than foreign firms (Alpay 2001, p. 13)￿. Secondly, ￿when 
environmental regulations become more stringent at home, and domestic firms try to 
innovate, market share of the domestic firms will increase (Alpay 2001, p. 14)￿ but only if 
(in the presence of innovation) the costs of permits per unit of output are lower after 
regulation have become more stringent. Also firms in the home country may be more 
competitive depending on the economic characteristics of the new technology, the costs of 
R&D, the price elasticity of permit demand, and the success probability of innovation in 
production/abatement technology (Alpay 2001). ￿Due to changes in permit prices with the 
enactment of stricter environmental policies, it is possible that the projects that were not 
feasible before can become profitable after the introduction of stricter environmental 
policies (Alpay 2001, p. 15)￿ because stricter regulation increases the price of permits and 
therefore the possibility of higher permit revenues, which may increase returns on 
innovation thus making additional innovations profitable. 
Finally, Alpay (2001, p. 17) finds that ￿when environmental regulation becomes more 
stringent at home, and only one domestic firm innovates, market share of the non-
innovating domestic firm will be less than the shares of the all [sic, M.W.] other firms￿. In   30 
this situation, the competitiveness of the domestic firm may rise relative to that of the other 
firms, depending on whether the cost of R&D are smaller than the benefits which depend 
on changes in abatement technology through innovation and changes in the permit market, 
and the probability of successful innovation. Overall, Alpay￿s (2001) analysis indicates 
stronger pro-revisionist theoretical evidence than previous formal models with the key 
feature being that the profits of a firm depend on permit revenues and hence permit market 
properties. This also means that it is not necessary to assume X-inefficiency (Sinclair-
DesgagnØ 1999, Gabel & Sinclair-DesgangØ 2001) for the Porter hypothesis to be valid. 
 
Mohr (2002) uses a model similar to that of Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) and 
additionally assumes external economies of scale (i.e. spillover) in production, thus 
allowing that productivity depends on the cumulative experience with a technology. Based 
on a general equilibrium model of a closed economy with many agents, constant 
population, perfect information and an environmental externality he shows that whilst ￿... 
environmental policy simultaneously increases productivity and welfare (Mohr 2002, p. 
159)￿, ￿￿ a policy that produces this result is not necessarily optimal (Mohr 2002, p. 
159)￿. Mohr (2002) shows that in his model, environmental regulation (in form of a tax) 
increases productivity and reduces the environmental externality if (i) an unused 
technology is available, which is always more efficient than the one currently used and (ii) 
if environmental policy favors the unused but more efficient technology. Therefore 
￿Porter￿s hypothesis is a plausible outcome if one allows for the possibility of technolo-
gical change with external economies of scale (Mohr 2002, p. 164)￿ but  ￿.. does not, 
however, imply that government should pick policies that raise output and reduce pollution 
(Mohr 2002, p. 164)￿ since ￿￿. it is quite possible that the optimal adoption of cleaner 
technology would result in both more output and more waste (Mohr 2002, p. 164)￿. This is 
because if the unused technology is more efficient, then the opportunity cost of abatement 
increases and (assuming a constant marginal disutility of pollution) it would be optimal for 
government to allow an increase in pollution/waste. 
Along the way, Mohr (2002) notes that interestingly, the Porter hypothesis is similar to the 
infant industry argument, which is consistent with economic theory and hence it may not 
be surprising, that this can also be the case for Porter￿s hypothesis. Mohr (2002) concludes 
on the basis of this that similar to those reasons that hinder the implementation of the 
infant-industry argument as a trade policy, problems with implementing the Porter 
hypothesis, despite of its validity, may outweigh its potential benefits.   31 
4.4 Conclusions from the theoretical analysis of the Porter hypothesis  
With regard to theoretical reasoning about the Porter hypothesis that strict environmental 
regulations translate into a long-run competitive advantage of national industries (and the 
basic argument made that, although regulations have an economic cost, properly 
constructed environmental standards may, whilst imposing costs, spur innovations which 
offset some or all  of the spending on pollution abatement) the evidence is mixed  Whilst 
there is evidence in formal models that  environmental protection is not a perfect zero-sum 
game, and that integrated regulatory systems (Esty 1994) are able to bring about ￿double 
dividends￿ this does not have to be economically efficient. Even if regulation leads to 
innovation offsets which reduce the  cost of compliance and produce competitive 
advantages for products and production processes, and simultaneously increase social 
welfare by reducing environmental externalities, this may not be an optimal choice. 
As conditions, under which a favourable relationship between environmental regulation 
and competitiveness, the following points emerge from a comparative analysis of the 
different models discussed: 
-  the use of economically efficient types of regulation, in particular tradable permits; 
-  a favourable market structure
13; in particular demand for environmentally 
differentiated goods by a sufficiently high number of consumers;  
-  the availability of unused technologies wit higher efficiency; 
-  downsizing and capital modernization make trade-offs less grim. 
                                                 
13 According to Bain (1959), market structure can be defined as a set of organizational features of a market 
which have a significant influence on the nature of competition in this market.   32 
5. Empirical analysis of the Porter hypothesis 
5.1 Introduction 
Whilst Porter and colleagues in their work provide some empirical evidence, they mainly 
focus on case studies, based on the argument that these ￿￿ are the only vehicle currently 
available to measure compliance costs and both direct and indirect innovation benefits 
(Porter & van der Linde 1995, p. 101￿. Whilst this was true at the time, even then already 
reviews of broad-based econometric empirical studies existed (e.g. Jaffe et al. 1995). 
Subsequently, more broad-based empirical work was reported (e.g. Albrecht 1998a; 1998b; 
Mulatu et al. 2001; Murty & Kumar 2003). However the basic argument concerning 
compliance costs is still valid in some ways (see e.g. Jaffe et al. 1995).
14  
                                                 
14 The argument about compliance cost measurement rests very much on the on-going environmental 
accounting debate. Environmental accounting at the firm level can be used in the contexts of financial or 
management accounting. In the first context it is addressing an external audience and is aimed at the 
estimation and public reporting of environmental liabilities and financially material environmental costs. In 
the context of management accounting, which uses a broad range of cost and performance data for internal 
decision-making, the aim is to integrate environmental accounting into cost allocation, capital budgeting and 
process/product design procedures (EPA 1995). Of particular relevance here are environmental costs and 
investments. Environmental costs refer to running costs that occur permanently over a production period. 
Running costs can be direct production costs or overheads. Environmental investments refer to costs that 
occur at one specific point in time. Such costs can be split up in direct investment costs (e.g. costs of plant & 
equipment) and overheads (e.g. interest payable for capital). Environmental costs can be further divided into 
conventional, direct costs and indirect costs. The latter group can be further subdivided into hidden or 
potentially hidden, contingent (i.e. liability) and image and relationship (i.e. less tangible) costs (EPA 1989; 
GEMI 1994). Conventional (environmental) costs (e.g. direct and indirect materials and labour or technical, 
sales and general administrative overheads) are addressed in cost accounting and capital budgeting, but are 
not usually perceived as environmental costs. Hidden or potentially hidden costs refer to up-front, operational 
and back-end costs incurred when complying with legislation or when improving environmental performance 
voluntarily beyond compliance (see Jaffe et al. 1995, pp. 139-142 for a detailed discussion). Such costs may 
be related to the clean-up of past pollution unrelated to current operations, to pollution control, clean-up or 
pollution prevention or reduction in current operations or to pollution prevention or reduction in future 
operations. Contingent environmental costs or benefits are costs or benefits that may be incurred or realized 
with a certain probability and a certain expected value at some point in the future. They represent less 
tangible or intangible environmental costs where direct benefits resulting from expenses to improve a firm￿s 
corporate image or the subjective perception of its stakeholder relationships are difficult to monetarise (EPA 
1995). Most commonly known environmental costs are costs of environmental remediation, expenditure on 
pollution control equipment, spending on non-compliance penalties and costs incurred for pollution 
prevention activities beyond required compliance levels. These most common environmental costs could be 
termed direct environmental costs and can be defined as environmental costs that are addressed in accounting 
as compliance costs. 
With regard to environmental investments, investment decision generally mean that a firm makes a cash 
outlay with the aim of receiving in return future cash inflows. Investment decisions are usually part of a 
firm￿s investment strategy which is formalized in its capital expenditure plans (Lumby 1991). The planned 
capital expenditures of a firm are part of its capital budgeting process and entail comparisons between 
predicted costs and revenues using different investment appraisal methods (e.g. payback, net present value, 
internal rate of return or return on capital employed). Traditional investment appraisal techniques usually 
exclude environmental costs, savings and revenues, but several new approaches have been proposed to 
incorporate these (EPA 1992; Earl 1996). In order to fully consider environmental costs, cost savings and 
revenues generated by different environmental investments and the potential but less tangible benefits of such 
investments have to be evaluated, if necessary through non-monetary valuation of environmental effects.   33 
5.2 Empirical studies addressing the Porter hypothesis 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) in their initial study of the Porter hypothesis cite several 
case studies as evidence for the validity of the Porter hypothesis. This concerns e.g. the cell 
battery, printing ink, electronics manufacturing, pulp and paper and refrigerator industries. 
According to them, case study evidence from primary research and analysis of published 
case study material supports a number of mechanisms through which the Porter hypothesis 
is put to work. This concerns e.g. substitution with cheaper materials and better process 
efficiency in materials utilization as well as premium prices and new markets for more 
environmentally sound products. Porter and van der Linde (1995) criticize that compliance 
cost estimates in econometric studies are overestimated because they assume away 
innovation benefits. Also such studies according to them do not sufficiently take into 
account the initial level of competitiveness in an industry. Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
also argue, that (in 1995) the large majority of studies did not reveal many adverse effects 
of environmental regulation on competitiveness and that those studies finding significant 
effects often used compliance cost estimates based on existing (inefficient) regulation that 
likely stifle many innovation offsets. This is an important issue, since any falsification of 
the Porter hypothesis based on regulation identified in Chapter 2 as being not economically 
efficient (e.g. standards based on emission limits) can not be regarded as evidence against 
the hypothesis (see Romstad (1998) and Chapter 2.2 for a more detailed discussion). This 
is because inefficient regulation increases compliance costs, thus making it less likely for 
innovation benefits to offset costs, i.e. such regulation introduces a systematic bias in 
empirical studies. Therefore, strictly speaking the Porter hypothesis can only be tested 
under regulation that has been shown to be economically efficient (such as systems based 
on taxes or certificates, see Chapter 2). Porter and van der Linde (1995) discuss in detail 
characteristics of efficient regulation, such as e.g. clear goals, flexible approaches, 
incentives for innovation and regulatory coordination. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Issues and steps in this respect are the full identification of potential costs and savings from an investment in 
environmental improvement, appropriate allocation of costs and benefits, appropriate indicators and methods 
for project appraisal and suitable payback time horizons. Potential less tangible benefits of pollution preventi-
on or other environmental investments have been identified (EPA 1995), including increased product sales 
leading to increased revenues and profits, better borrowing conditions for capital (i.e. lower interest rates and 
risk premiums), improved market performance, e.g. higher share prices, cost savings from reduced inputs, 
improved health and safety and more efficient processes, increased labour productivity due to higher 
employee motivation and efficiency, better relationships with regulators, especially easier approvals of 
expansion plans, and reduced costs due to improved corporate image and relationships with stakeholders. 
Measurement of these types of compliance costs is very complex and this is why Porter and van der Linde 
argue, that it can only be done on a case study basis focusing on one or few firms.   34 
 
Jaffe et al. (1995) review 16 empirical studies on the effects of environmental regulation 
on competitiveness with particular focus on the U.S., and limited to manufacturing firms. 
Whilst pointing out, that direct compliance costs are only a fraction of the total social costs 
of environmental regulation, they conclude that ￿.. there is relatively little evidence to 
support the hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on 
competitiveness, however that elusive term is defined (Jaffe et al. 1995, p. 157)￿. In their 
survey, they analyse studies using many of the different measures of competitiveness 
discussed in Chapter 3 (net exports, overall trade flows, plant location decisions). Jaffe et 
al. (1995) also acknowledge data problems as a serious impediment to more conclusive 
results. They discuss as well a sub-set of studies analyzing the productivity effects of 
regulation, which is most relevant to the propositions of the Porter hypothesis. Here, the 
finding is that for the period 1970-80, total factor productivity growth in the U.S. is 
estimated to decline by 8-16 percent due to increased regulatory costs which means that 
these are not main drivers for productivity losses.
15 
Jaffe et al. (1995) note that average productivity in individual industries could in theory 
increase (and not decrease) if more stringent regulation forces the most inefficient plants to 
close but have doubt that ￿￿ continually higher regulatory standards would lead firms 
regularly to discover new clean and profitable technologies (p. 156)￿ and note that (in 
1995) ￿systematic empirical evidence in this area is only beginning (p. 157)￿.  
 
Since the aggregated effect for the manufacturing industry of a country (measured e.g. in 
terms of industry (FDI) migration or changes in trade patterns) is constituted of the 
individual changes in each of the constituting industries, it is necessary to identify more 
precisely conditions and parameters for an industry to profit or dis-benefit from stringent 
regulation. For example, Albrecht (1998a; 1998b) has focused his analysis on specific in-
dustries/products (here refrigerators, freezers, air conditioning equipment, fire 
extinguishers, foams, aerosols and solvents for cleaning of electronic equipment) affected 
by the Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Depleting Substances and provides evidence in two 
countries (U.S. and Denmark) that their competitive position was enhanced by stringent 
regulation. He argues that for each product a country exports the compliance and 
environmental costs caused by (more) stringent regulation will differ and that this is 
                                                 
15 It has to be noted as well, that in the period when effects were observed only limited incentive-
based/market-based regulation (e.g. taxes or certificates, see Chapter 2) existed.   35 
masked if industry total figures are used, which usually refer to a large number of products. 
The Montreal Protocol is identified as particularly suitable for a product-specific test of the 
Porter hypothesis, since the corresponding regulations have been implemented almost 
simultaneously in different countries with very similar objectives (phase-out of 
chlorofluorocarbons, CFC) without exemption of a significant number of firms. For 
example, due to the Protocol, all countries face the same technological substitution costs. 
Albrecht (1998b) analyses empirically, if the competitiveness of the main CFC-using ma-
nufacturers in the U.S. and Denmark has increased after the implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol by investigating changes in trade flows for the three most relevant 
industry sectors in 1989-95. The dependent variable for this analysis was the change in 
bilateral exports for the country of origin and the independent variables the change in 
bilateral exports which the country of origin imported from the buying countries, the 
relative change in the bilateral exchange rate and a dummy variable taking unity value for 
the U.S. and Denmark (as countries with pro-active/stringent environmental regulations) 
and zero for all other countries (France, Germany and Japan).
16  
The analysis found that the dummy variable for early action in the U.S. and Denmark was 
significant in regressions pooling all three sectors, as well as in the sector-individual 
regressions for household refrigerators and freezers and for industrial refrigeration, but not 
for air conditioning (the possible reason being, that mobile and stationary air conditioning 
could not be separated in the analysis). Albrecht (1998b) concludes that ￿￿ the two 
countries with a relatively active CFC-policy and relatively high CFC-substitution costs 
could improve their competitiveness and hence export performance (p. 16)￿, and considers 
this as more than anecdotal evidence in favour of the Porter hypothesis. According to him, 
the limited empirical evidence from other surveys addressing the effect of environmental 
regulation on competitiveness may result from the use of a non-optimal methodology 
pooling many different industrial sectors and even more products and thus masking any 
effects in specific industries by aggregation influences. 
 
Mulatu et al. (2001) use the meta-analysis technique, especially meta-regression, to analyse 
empirical studies on the effect of stringent environmental regulation on international trade 
                                                 
16 Due to data unavailability, no other variables, such as labour productivity or wage rates were included in 
the analysis.   36 
in order to establish the conclusiveness of empirical work on this topic.
17 Analysing 13 
studies based on the exploratory, Leontief and econometric approaches, they conclude that 
based on simple-vote counting, a high number of effect estimates are insignificant and that 
the number of significant negative estimates is considerably higher than that of positive 
ones, thus casting doubt on the empirical validity of the Porter hypothesis as concerns 
international trade. However, Mulatu et al. (2001) find that votes differ depending on the 
method used to estimate effect sizes. For example, differences in means lead to many 
significant negative estimates, whereas correlation coefficients are either insignificant or 
significantly positive. Using a number of different statistical methods for combining 
significance levels (minimum-p, sum of z￿s, sum of logs and Logit), the authors find ￿￿ 
that for all types of studies all four methods almost always reject the null hypothesis that 
the relationship between environmental stringency and trade performance is not 
significantly different from zero (Mulatu et al. 2001, p. 17)￿. This means, that for the type 
of studies analysed, a significant (positive or negative) effect should exist. 
In the final part of their study, Mulatu et al. (2001) in a meta-regression analysis estimate 
based on an ordered Probit model the effects of a number of methodological factors on the 
(differing) results of primary studies analyzing the effect of stringent environmental 
regulations on international trade. Such factors include whether a Heckscher-Ohlin model 
or the gravity model was used, if the study used the exploratory, Leontief or econometric 
approach, whether the studies reported dollar values, elasticities or other data, if the 
stringency of regulation was assessed by means of abatement costs, a categorical 
stringency index, or qualitative measures, whether multi- or bilateral trade flows were 
considered, if time series data of industries, cross-sectional data of industries or countries, 
or industry or country panel data were used, which year the effect size estimates referred 
to, what time period was covered, and what the ratio of the number of less developed to de-
veloped countries in a study was. Mulatu et al. (2001) find that econometric studies (rather 
than exploratory and Leontief studies), the presence of less developed countries in the 
sample and application of the gravity model as well as studies analyzing more recent data 
yield significantly less negative results. Also, if stringency is measured by a qualitative or 
categorical index, significantly more negative results are found, confirming the measure-
                                                 
17 Meta-analysis (considered to be more reliable than vote-counting used commonly in literature surveys) 
assumes that existing empirical studies on a specific topic are drawn from the universe of perceivable studies 
and statistically interferes from the sample of studies to the conclusiveness of empirical evidence in general 
for the topic in question, whilst controlling for influences of research designs, data quality etc. (Hedges & 
Olkin 1985).   37 
ment debate surrounding stringency and the need to address this issue. Significantly more 
negative results are also found, if sectoral instead of country data is analysed, if cross-
section and panel data instead of time-series data are studied, trade flows are measured 
bilaterally, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the estimation procedure chosen and when 
including pollution intensive industries. Overall, Mulatu et al. (2001) conclude ￿￿ that the 
empirical literature does not strongly support the hypothesis, that the effect of envi-
ronmental regulation on competitiveness is negative (p. 22)￿, but at the same time reject 
the hypothesis that there is no significant effect in almost all cases. The suggest that ￿the 
environmental regulation-competitiveness linkage should be investigated with data on the 
industrial level ￿ (Mulatu et al. 2001, p.23)￿ as e.g. done by Albrecht (1998a; 1998b) due 
to regulation being industry-specific and that better stringency measures should be used. 
 
The study by Murty and Kumar (2003) analyses the influence of environmental regulation 
on the productive efficiency of 92 firms in 12 water-polluting industries in India for the 
period 1996-1999 based on simultaneous estimation of the causal link between technical 
inefficiency and environmental regulation and the stochastic output distance function using 
the maximum likelihood method. Date is based on a primary survey and covers wastewater 
amounts, loads of Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
and Suspended Solids (SS) loads as well as sales as outputs and wage bills, capital stock 
and monetary value of materials as inputs. From these data, a regulation index defined as 
the geometric mean of the three normalized measures of BOD, COD and SS each 
normalized by scaling down each observation by the respective maximum across all years. 
The index is used as a measure for firm compliance (the higher the value the lower 
compliance). Also, a conservation index is defined as the ratio of wastewater to sales. 
Estimation of the relevant parameters of the output and input functions reveals that most 
parameters are significant and that technical inefficiency is no linear function of the 
regulation index, conservation index and the time variable, respectively. The former two 
variables are found to be significant whereas the latter is not. Also, the analysis reveals, 
that the determinants of inefficiency account for the majority of the variation of technical 
inefficiency. Murty and Kumar (2003) furthermore find that the higher is firms￿ 
compliance, and the lower wastewater output per unit of sales is, the lower is the technical 
inefficiency of the firm, thus lending support to the Porter hypothesis.  
   38 
5.3 Conclusions from comparing empirical work on the Porter hypothesis  
The comparison of empirical studies testing the Porter hypothesis reveals, that several 
levels need to be distinguished, to which the Porter hypothesis can be applied. This 
concerns at least the firm, industry, country levels. Depending on which level is the focus 
of analysis, results may differ. Also, comparison of studies is hindered by the use of 
different measures for competitiveness and stringency of environmental regulation. In 
particular measurement of the latter seems to be particular difficult (in the absence of un-
disputed definitions) yet at the same time crucial for the interpretation of results from 
empirical studies, which overall indicate a small positive effect.   39 
6. Comparison and conclusions  
6.1 Introduction 
This final chapter will analyse comparatively the theoretical arguments and models and 
empirical studies on the Porter hypothesis and will discuss implications for policy making 
and future research. It will also, as far as possible, attempt to define more precisely 
conditions, which support the Porter hypothesis. Here, particular focus will be placed on 
critical aspects that have emerged during the analysis of theoretical reasoning and 
empirical work on the Porter hypothesis. Especially, these concern measuring stringency of 
and approach to environmental regulation, the level at which the Porter hypothesis is 
analysed, and the role of innovations.  
 
6.2 A comparative analysis of findings on the Porter hypothesis 
A comparative analysis of the Porter hypothesis can be done between different theoretical 
models, between different empirical studies, between theoretical and empirical work and 
between different interpretations and levels of analysis of the Porter hypothesis. For 
theoretical models it is found that: 
•  there are factors to do with capital structure that make the trade-offs implied by 
critics of the Porter hypothesis less strong and thus the hypothesis more likely to 
hold (Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw 1999); 
•  a favourable demand side can make the Porter hypothesis more likely to hold 
(Alanen 1998; Reinhard 1999; Lankoski 2000); 
•  specific (more flexible) types of instruments for environmental regulation (in 
particular tradable permit systems) bring about more favourable conditions and thus 
make it more likely for the Porter hypothesis to hold (Alpay 2001); 
•  conditions under which the Porter hypothesis holds seem to be depending on the 
pollutants concerned, i.e. the hypothesis is likely to hold more strongly for some 
pollutants than for others. 
Concerning empirical work, the consensus emerging (Portney 2002 quoted in Anonymous 
2002) is that the negative macroeconomic impact of environmental regulation is likely 
small, since the latter empirically leads to both, increasing or decreasing employment (see 
e.g. Rennings et al. 2001; Morgenstern et al. 2002), depending on the specific conditions. 
Also environmental regulation empirically led to only very small increases of the rate of   40 
inflation and therefore was not the prime cause for negative economic effects.
18 The 
analysis of reduced compliance costs on employment, GDP growth rates and productivity 
show empirically only small effects and thus environmental regulation is generally 
sociable with economic growth. Nevertheless trade-offs exist resulting from higher 
expenditure caused by more stringent environmental regulation which substitutes spending 
that would otherwise lead to an increase in measured GDP, since simultaneous spending on 
both is impossible. In conclusion, empirical research to date makes it thus likely that al-
though Porter￿s hypothesis may hold in individual industrial sectors or for more narrow 
interpretations in specific countries under certain regulatory conditions. It is unlikely to 
hold (empirically as well as theoretically) in its most general form across all levels of ana-




6.3 Measuring the stringency of and approach to environmental regulation 
As can be seen from empirical studies, it is of pivotal importance to carefully address the 
measurement of regulatory stringency. As Mulatu et al. (2001) have shown, the choice of 
stringency measures has in many cases a significant influence on the results of empirical 
research. Romstad (1998) points out that from a theoretical viewpoint, it is absolutely in-
dispensable, that any study actually ensures that the regulatory system analysed empirically 
is economically efficient in the sense discussed in Chapter 2.1. Otherwise a rejection of the 
Porter hypothesis can not be taken as such, since additional costs of inefficient regulation 
would have to be taken into account.
20 It seems likely, that in most countries analysed in 
empirical studies there is at least some economic inefficiency in environmental regulations. 
For example, in Germany environmental regulation has a long tradition of ￿command-and-
control￿ legislation and thus in many instances cannot be assumed efficient and this is also 
the case in other countries (Jaffe et al. 1995; Br￿nnlund et al. 1995; Hahn 1989). In 
addition to this, of the multitude of instruments for environmental regulation discussed in 
                                                 
18 It has to be noted that these conclusions mainly apply to the U.S. and developing countries and do not take 
into account transfer effects. Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) provide a detailed discussion of transfer effects on 
trade flows. 
19 For example, Xing and Kolstad (2002) find evidence that for highly polluting industries in the U.S. less 
stringent environmental regulation in host countries is a significant factor determining foreign direct 
investment of firms from such industries in the host countries. 
20 Total regulatory costs can be broken down into the costs of achieving an emissions standard and the costs 
resulting from inefficiency of regulation. Assuming globally increasing and converging emission standards 
for trans-boundary pollutants, the costs of inefficiency become relatively more important (Romstad 1998).   41 
Chapter 2.1, only a subset has been applied in practice. For example, tradable emission 
permit systems have only become relevant (except for regionally limited applications in the 
U.S.) for environmental policy making since the Kyoto protocol is on the agenda, even 
though due to the current status of non-ratification of the protocol, they have been 
implemented scarcely, so far. One of the few examples is the emissions trading system for 
greenhouse gases now adopted and in the process of implementation for the EU. Because 
of this situation, only very limited empirical work has been analyzing regulatory regimes 
predominantly based on tradable permit systems even though Alpay (2001) shows that for 
these, compared to a tax based system as e.g. the one analysed by Simpson and Bradford 
III (1996), the mechanisms behind the Porter hypothesis are more likely to work 
successfully. Finally, it should be a topic for future research to develop a standard measure 
that (jointly) measures the stringency of and approach to environmental regulation, since 
both aspects have an effect. 
Even though to date, empirical studies have differentiated to a lesser degree than 
theoretical work and reasoning between the different instruments of environmental policy 
making discussed in Chapter 2.1, this will beyond doubt change in future with the 
increasing relevance of taxes, tradable emission permit systems and voluntary initiatives 
and agreements (such as the environmental management system standards ISO 
(International Standards Organization) 14001 and EMAS
21). 
 
6.4 Different interpretations and level of analysis of the Porter hypothesis 
One important issue when analyzing empirically the Porter hypothesis is that it can be 
interpreted in different ways. According to Jaffe et al. (1995) the hypothesis may mean that 
specific industries will benefit from environmental regulation of their customers, that 
innovatory activity in specific technology areas will be increased because of environmental 
regulation, that some companies will benefit from more stringent regulation at the expense 
of other firms (which would e.g. be the case if inefficient firms in an industry go out of 
business), that there will be ￿early/first mover￿ advantages for some firms, or that the (net) 
competitiveness of a whole national economy (across all industries or at least in terms of 
net changes across all industries) will be increased through stringent regulation (which 
would be the case if innovation caused by increased stringency of regulation leads to im-
proved environmental quality and improved productivity). Another aspect that influences 
                                                 
21 Eco-Management and Audit Scheme of the EU   42 
empirical results is therefore at which level the Porter hypothesis is analysed in empirical 
studies. Given this wide range of interpretations, empirical analyses after 1995 have usual-
ly focused on one specific interpretation and have usually not compared the results for 
different views. It is thus necessary to distinguish precisely between the different possible 
levels, at which the Porter hypothesis can be analysed. At least, these are the level of the 
individual firm, the level of an industry and the level of the national economy. 
For individual firms, testing of the Porter hypothesis essentially means to analyse the 
relationship between environmental performance and economic performance, taking into 
account the type of environmental management a firm uses and its specific regulatory 
environment. The firm level is the most disaggregated level of analysis for the Porter 
hypothesis and it is this level, for which Porter and van der Linde (1995) cite numerous 
case study evidence, since only at this level it is possible to precisely measure full environ-
mental costs and benefits (see Chapter 5.1 for a more detailed discussion on the full 
measurement of environmental costs and benefits). At the level of individual firms, it 
needs to be considered as well if all or only a limited group of firms (e.g. only large firms) 
in an industry benefit from more stringent regulation, since the aggregated effect for an 
individual industrial sector is constituted of the effect of regulation on the competitiveness 
and economic performance of each individual firm. 
Whilst an analysis at the industry level will mask any differences between individual firms, 
it is still more disaggregated than an analysis at the national level. As the empirical work of 
Albrecht (1998a; 1998b) shows, results at the level of individual industries may differ 
considerably from those for whole countries or national economies. Next to one specific 
industry, it is also possible, to analyse a narrow cluster of (similar) industries. A parameter 
on which findings critically depend at this (but also at the more aggregated national) level 
is which industries are included in the (empirical) analysis. For example, for the pulp and 
paper industry alone, empirical studies provide rather strong evidence that more stringent 
environmental regulations put firms in the industry at a competitive disadvantage 
(Br￿nnlund et al. 1995; Barbera & McConnell 1990), whereas including resource-intensive 
process industries similar to the pulp and paper industry can actually alter results which 
may in turn be completely different for industries with relatively low energy and resource 
intensities. The different possible levels of analysis can be found in empirical studies, but 
are not much differentiated in theoretical reasoning about the Porter hypothesis, which 
usually focuses on simple models and country-level analysis. In future, a more complex 
and disaggregated analysis, based on e.g. approaches in industrial economics and industrial   43 
organization (Hay & Morris 1991; Schmalensee 1989) as well as more elaborate modeling 
approaches are desirable to supplement existing work. 
 
6.5 The role of innovations in the Porter hypothesis 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) note the particular role of innovations as a mechanism for 
putting the Porter hypothesis to work. This is because the concept of innovation offsets 
(i.e. private benefits to firms from innovatory activity triggered by stringent, yet efficient, 
environmental regulation) is central to the Porter hypothesis. Opponents to this view argue 
that the existence of profitable or at least cost-effective opportunities (at the firm, industry 
or national level) to reduce environmental pollution as proposed in the Porter hypothesis 
are not likely in most industries. In the best case it pays for firms in such industries to 
pursue emission reductions until they meet their industry￿s regulatory standards. Over-
compliance in these industries is unlikely, since it would only be rational for firms if it can 
be achieved through cost-effective pollution abatement, which by assumption is not 
possible here and therefore regulation beyond emission levels corresponding to the private 
optimum would increase production costs and in turn reduce profitability and 
competitiveness (Romstad 1998). 
Given their pivotal role in the Porter hypothesis, future research on innovation in this 
context seems to have some merit. It is argued (Anonymous 2002) that the relative 
influence of innovation drivers such as private investment or government expenditure in 
R&D, spending for improvement of education systems, regulation or price changes is 
unclear and that hence innovation policy should focus on realising prices which reflect full 
social costs, on correcting for external externalities, and on eliminating subsidies. This 
could be a starting point for future empirical research and theoretical work. 
Other aspects of future research may be that environmental regulation in general should be 
providing incentives for innovation. As can be seen from Table 1 in Chapter 2.1 (which 
also provides a more detailed discussion) such characteristics mainly apply to 
(environmental) taxes and certificates (i.e. tradable emission permit systems) which should 
thus be applied more often in practice if it is wished to create conditions favourable to the 
Porter hypothesis (Hemmelskamp 1997, see also Montero (2002) for a more detailed ana-
lysis of innovation incentives provided by different types of instruments). As is known 
from innovation theory and regulation theory in general, innovation should also not be 
focused on specific technologies and take into account the direction of technological   44 
progress at least equally to the rate of innovation. Finally, regulation should be close to the 
end-user of a technology and also consider voluntary agreements as well as standards and 
labels for environmentally more sound products (see e.g. Hemmelskamp 1999; Jaffe et al. 
2002; Teisl et al. 2002; Rennings et al. 2003 for more detailed discussions of specific as-
pects mentioned here). Despite the limitations of Porter￿s hypothesis
22, it provides 
arguments for preferring incentive based regulations over command-and-control type regu-
lation, since the former likely reduce abatement costs. Incentive based regulation, in 
particular tradable emission permit systems maintain incentives for firms in an industry to 
reduce emissions through innovation, provide cost effective allocation and abatement solu-
tions and are therefore likely to at least limit reductions in the profitability of firms. Eco-
nomic efficiency of regulations (see Chapter 2.1) is pivotal here because low cost 
regulatory approaches are most likely to reduce trade leakages which have adverse effects 
on overall social welfare and such approaches can also reduce barriers to international 
cooperation on trans-boundary pollution (Romstad 1998). In doing so, efficient regulation 
can indirectly create competitive advantages (or at least reduce competitive disadvantages) 
for firms competing internationally, since it reduces part of their regulatory costs whilst at 
the same time having the potential to trigger innovation offsets that at least reduce the costs 
of regulation. 
                                                 
22 For Europe, there has been little research on the Porter hypothesis (for exceptions, see e.g. Hitchens 1999; 
Rennings et al. 2001; 2003) and future empirical should focus here.   45 
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